

The University of Chicago

TWO NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF THE
TRUTH SITUATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1931

By
CHESTER MILTON KEARNEY

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
Chicago, Illinois
1933

The University of Chicago

**TWO NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF THE
TRUTH SITUATION**

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1931

By
CHESTER MILTON KEARNEY

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
Chicago, Illinois
1933



PREFACE

I do not claim any originality for the problem which I have selected, nor for the two concepts of 'interest' and 'social objectivity' which I have proposed to solve the problem. All students who have been members of Professor Burt's seminars for the two years just past will readily recognize the nature of the materials I use as a starting point. I wish to acknowledge the interest that Professor Burt has taken in my attempts to make these problems my own and to follow through some implications which have appealed to me.

The "List of Books Referred to", which is appended to this paper, is not intended as an exhaustive bibliography, or even as a bibliography at all. The nature of the problem is such that little formal bibliographical material seems to be available. I have merely listed the works referred to and have not duplicated full names, publisher, place, and date in the footnotes themselves. This information is placed in the formal list at the end of the treatise where in case of need it may be found.

My indebtedness to other writers is great. In particular, I have been impressed by Professor Urban's *The Intelligible World*, and Professor Lewis' *Mind and the World Order*. I have found in both suggestions which have been fruitful in working toward a solution of my problem. I wish to acknowledge this indebtedness, although my own position is quite different from that which either maintains. I have found Professor Ducasse's articles on his 'liberalism' stimulating and in harmony with much that I have been driving at. One cannot take work with Professor Brogan for the better part of a

year without being impressed with a genial scepticism which also has pointed criticism and constructive suggestion for most of the current philosophical problems. So far as I can tell, these are the main sources of the materials from which I have drawn, and which I have tried to use in my own way for the pursuit of the solution to an interesting problem.

The interest of my wife and of my colleagues at Aurora College has been a source of inspiration during some rather hectic periods while this dissertation has been in process of preparation.

C. M. K.

Aurora, Illinois.

November 26, 1931.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	iii-iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
INTRODUCTION	1-7
I. The Problem	1
II. Not Dealt with Adequately by the Classical Theories.....	2
III. Truth More Complex than the Classical Theories Suggest.....	4
IV. Suggested Outline	6
CHAPTER I INTEREST AND COGNITION.....	7-25
I. Interest and Sensory Content.....	7
II. Interest and the Organization of Objects.....	9
III. Interest and Explanatory Concepts.....	11
IV. Interest and the Value Element in Concepts.....	13
V. Solution Suggested by the Foregoing.....	17
VI. Illustrations Suggested by this Solution.....	19
(a) Objective Dogmatism—Urban	19
(b) Subjective Dogmatism—Bradley	21
(c) Social Objectivity—Jefferson	22
VII. A Caution Regarding the Meaning of Objectivity.....	24
CHAPTER II SOCIAL OBJECTIVITY	26-45
I. The Meaning of Social Objectivity.....	26
II. The Concept Used in Theory and in Practice in Various Fields..	31
III. Communication the Mechanism for Securing Social Objectivity—	
its Presuppositions	36
IV. Communication and Interest	38
V. Summary	43
CHAPTER III. CONCLUSIONS	46-52
I. Implications for the Nature of Truth.....	47
II. Further Suggestions for Logic.....	48
III. Some Questions for Metaphysics.....	50
LIST OF WORKS REFERRED TO.....	53-55



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/IA41546416_0149

TWO NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF THE TRUTH SITUATION

INTRODUCTION

I

I shall start my inquiry with the obvious fact (a) that two persons dealing with the same 'facts' do not always agree, and yet (b) each feels that the other *ought* to agree and cannot understand why he does not. Differences of capacity in observation and training may be properly discounted, yet two men will frequently differ with respect to the meaning and significance of a given body of 'data'. But one must acknowledge that the conclusions of both are honestly arrived at, and each feels that somehow his conclusion should be acceptable and valid for the other party.

The complete solution of this problem would involve the presentation of a complete theory of truth. I do not undertake such an ambitious task in this paper. Rather, I shall consider two phases of the truth situation without attempting to present a more complex theory of truth which would be adequate to embody them. I shall follow up the implications of these two problems in themselves, and seek in the process by way of exposition, analysis, and illustration, to lay the groundwork for further work which seems needed in the theory of truth.

I shall suggest (a) that the reason that two persons differ if faced with the same 'facts' is that they have different interests, or, to use Professor Urban's expression, 'they acknowledge different values'; and (b) the claim for validity with respect to others can best be solved by a concept of 'social objectivity' which I shall seek to expand.

II

The significant elements in the traditional theories of truth are the idea and the object. We may, accordingly, look for truth in three areas: (a) in the idea, (b) in the object, or (c) in some relation between them.

The classical attempts to find some element in the idea, which could be equated with truth, are found in the theories of such rationalists as Descartes and Spinoza. The basis of the Cartesian system is that clear and distinct ideas must be true.¹ Nor can Spinoza see any escape from an infinite regress unless adequate ideas carry with them the mark of their authenticity. Other instances of this tendency of securing some simple quality in the idea as a test, or criterion, of truth will not further our present purpose of pointing out the existence of such views.

There have also been efforts to attribute truth to some characteristic in the object. The absolute idealists have thought of truth as the coherence and harmony of a transcendent experience in which all finite contradictions are moulded into a unified whole.² *Our* ideas are all inadequate because they do not have that stability and coherence which is characteristic of reality—the object of all our judgments. The neo-realists have attempted to identify the idea with the object, and have also sought to place truth in the one realm left to them, namely, the object.

Similarly there have been, and still are, those who find truth to consist in some relation between the idea and the object. In general, the relationship has been expressed by correspondence. Locke considered such a relationship to obtain between the ideas and the objects; Rogers, and other critical realists, hold to a similar relation between essence and object.

¹ This is a test rather than a theory of truth. But if the test is significant it should be related to the theory. This is a real problem for certain types of dualisms.

² I do not wish to raise the question of the relation of the cognitive to other elements in the experience of the absolute. That is another problem.

The pragmatic movement has emphasized another element in the truth situation. It has justly criticized the rationalists of both of the traditional schools for their failure to take account of the essentially purposive character of thought and truth. This emphasis has tended to set out in relief consequences and predictions as significant and essential factors in the truth situation. So far as the previous theories were deficient in this respect—and they were—pragmatism has done valuable service. Yet it too, has tended to emphasize just these parts of the truth situation to the exclusion of others equally important. Pragmatism has called attention to a neglected element in truth, but it has not successfully incorporated other elements stressed by the other theories.

For purposes of orientation the general relationship of these theories to the problem I have chosen may be briefly indicated. The attempt to find some element in the idea to which to equate truth would explain why individuals differ, but it would offer no explanation as to why the idea should be binding on others. Descartes was really helpless if one of his opponents, who disagreed with him, affirmed that the opposing statement was also based on a clear and distinct idea. Any theory of truth which depends on a subjective criterion will always encounter the same difficulty.

Those theories which identify truth with certain elements of the object are defective in the opposite respect. They give basis for a claim to validity for other persons, but they do not properly account for the fact of disagreement. If the truth is a quality of the object, why, then, do not all find it there, and agree when given the same body of evidence? As stated, no adequate solution seems possible, except, perhaps, to suggest that the other person is defective in some truth-acquiring capacity.

The correspondence theory, which makes truth a relationship between the idea and the object, suffers from the defects

of both theories without furthering the solution of the present problem. One may start from his own ideas. How then get to the object? Subjectivism is the result. The attempt to import essences, and make them objects, is a move in the direction of objective theories and becomes involved in difficulties common to them.

The pragmatists have gone farthest in suggesting a solution to the problem concerning differences. They have stressed the significance of interests and values as elements in truth and knowledge, yet they have not taken the other half of the problem seriously and endeavored, in any detailed fashion, to connect the variation of interest with the claim for objectivity.

The general conclusion to draw from this very cursory criticism is that the traditional theories are too simple. The views just mentioned may be termed monadic, or dyadic theories of truth. A theory is the former when it involves only one element—when truth is found either in the idea or the object; it is dyadic when it is found in some relationship between them. I shall venture to suggest that truth will be found to be much more complex in character than these classic theories suggest. In the language just used, it will be polyadic.

III

This complex aspect of the nature of truth is now being more widely recognized. Professor Loewenberg, in a recent article, has found that he cannot state the truth situation adequately unless it indicates its character by at least four prepositions which relate truth to four different aspects of experience.³ Similarly, Professor Montague surveys the field of knowledge and then suggests a federation of the methods which have been emphasized piecemeal by historic schools. Such a federation would regard each method as dealing with

³ "The Prepositional Nature of Truth", *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, 1929, Vol. II. See the article by Professor Mackay on "The Nature of Truth in Transformation", p. 133.

some aspect of the general realm of knowledge and truth. I quote Professor Montague:

"By this discussion of ententes and alliances we may be led to conceive of a genuine federation of logical methods, whereby each contending theory, in exchange for its claim to monopolize all truth, would be assigned a unique function and permanent value in no way irreconcilable with that of its rivals. This would mean an arrangement according to which the methods, instead of warring upon one another's merits, would peacefully supplement one another's defects."⁴

From England we find a similar recognition of the complexity of the problem. Reid, in his *Truth and Knowledge* states,

"When any one of the steps in the development of full-fledged judgment is isolated and taken to be the whole, the others being forgotten, then we get false notions of truth and knowledge."⁵

And Professor Muirhead, in a recent article presented while visiting this country, says,

"On the one hand and in the first place we must, I believe, start from the recognition that all judgments or systems of judgments for which truth is claimed are at best only lights kindled here and there on the dark background of an experience which includes perceptual, emotional, and volitional as well as conceptual elements. It is this background which at certain points and in certain circumstances is continually "boiling over" into thought, and which remains as the basis and condition of thought."⁶

Further comment on those statements is unnecessary. In each of them is a recognition of the growing belief that truth is approachable from many angles, and that the tendency to regard any one theory as complete and final is now passing. There is a movement toward a federation of methods—a recognition of the value of the emphasis made by one's philosophic opponent.

⁴ Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 211.

⁵ Reid, *Truth and Knowledge*, p. 202.

⁶ *University of California Publications*, 1928, Vol. X, p. 22.

IV

I shall assume rather dogmatically, but for purposes of exposition, that the classical theories of truth have not dealt adequately with the problem which I have suggested. I shall set myself the task of (1) suggesting a solution to that fact that (a) persons presented with the same facts do not always agree as to the conclusions to be drawn from them, and (b) yet each feels that his conclusions ought to be valid for others; and (2) to draw from my analysis certain implications as to the nature of knowledge and truth which will call for further work in the general field of epistemology.

The general nature of the discussion will be occupied, first, with the relation of value and cognition. I will seek to show that interests and value operate in cognition as selective and organizing factors which must be taken account of, and when so taken account of, suggest partial solutions to the problems presented. This analysis of interest and cognition also suggests the significance of the concept of 'social objectivity' which is then further expended and shown to be tacitly recognized in a number of fields, and to suggest further interesting problems for epistemology. To a more detailed discussion of these topics which I have just hinted at, I now turn.

Chapter I

INTERESTS AND COGNITION

I

Professor Urban has recently emphasized the inseparability of value from meaning,¹ and Professor Perry has also recognized a close relationship between interests and cognition.² I wish to pursue the relationship in terms different from those either has used in dealing with the problem. The point I wish to make has been stated so clearly by James that I will quote briefly from him to indicate the general trend of my thought.

"Now the study of the phenomena of consciousness which we shall make throughout the rest of this book will show us that consciousness is at all times primarily a *selecting agency*. Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of intellection, we find it always doing one thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible all the rest. The item emphasized is always in close connection with some *interest* felt by consciousness to be paramount at the time."³

I want to take up the function of interest as a selective agency in its relation to three elements of knowledge: (a) sensory content; (b) organization of objects, and (c) explanatory concepts. It will be my contention that on each of these factors of knowledge interest operates as a selective agency, drawing out those materials that promote the interest, and neglecting those which are irrelevant to it.

I do not think it will need any extended exposition to convince one that our interests operate in the selection of sensory content. One has only to pause at any moment and listen to all the sounds which are presented to the senses,

¹ Urban, *The Intelligible World*, Chaps. II, III, V.

² Perry, *General Theory of Value*, Chaps. XI, XII.

³ James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 139. Cf. pp. 284ff.

but which are disregarded. One may converse with ease with one's neighbor in an audience, yet, if, for a moment, one pauses and listens to the confusion created by all the groups of conversationalists, a perfect chaos is found to exist. The noises of a city are disregarded by those who dwell there, yet one who is not used to them wonders how a person can live in such confusion. It is a matter of common jesting that one who works in a boiler factory can hear a whisper in spite of the din. The same is true for the other senses. From the array of color presented in the field of vision, attention focuses on a small area and excludes all the other stimuli which by other means are known as present to the sense organs. It is only the very striking smells, pleasing or not, that we give out attention to, yet if one pause to consider the smells which are constantly presented, the selective element is obvious. So with the other senses.

The sensory elements which are disregarded form the background of attention. Lewis has suggested that a toothache that was present all the time would not be an object at all, but part of the general feeling tone of the organism itself. It is the same with the other sensory elements. While they are not consciously attended to, yet they function as context; they are part of the *feeling-tone of the organism*. They may be the source of irritation or repose, as they are jarring or quieting. But for cognitive purposes only a few of the many elements presented in experience are selected out by attention. The rest are passed by, awaiting selection in their turn, or, are destined to fall in the background and affect our life only indirectly, if no interest ever calls out active attention to them.⁴

⁴ Cf. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order*, Chap. II and pp. 358-359; Fox, *Educational Psychology*, Chap. III; Johnson, *The Historian and Historical Evidence*, Chaps. II, VI; Follett, *Creative Experience*, pp. 10ff; Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, p. 158; Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, p. 250; Bradley, *Logic*, pp. 628-632.

II

But attention also operates in the organization of objects by a selective process just as it does in the sensory content. Events are related to other events in many ways. One event

Woodworth, *Psychology*, Chap. XI. The first law of attention is formulated, "—of two or more inconsistent responses to the same situation (or complex of stimuli) only one is made at the same time." p. 256.

Hollingsworth, *Psychology*, "Even mechanically weak processes, such as those constituting ideas, may outweigh intense sensory impressions in the control of thought and conduct. All that is required is that they possess sufficient *interest*." p. 409.

Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, "Selective emphasis, with accompanying omission and rejection, is the heart-beat of mental life. To object to the operation is to discard all thinking. But in ordinary matters and in scientific inquiries, we always retain the sense that the material chosen is selected for a purpose; there is no idea of denying what is left out, for what is omitted is merely that which is not relevant to the particular problem and purpose in hand." p. 25. Revised Edition.

Pillsbury, *Attention*, "As in the eye there is a point of clearest vision, where all impressions are very distinct as opposed to the vagueness of the objects seen with other parts of the retina, so in the mind there are always a few processes which stand out clearly, while the others are blurred and indefinite. . . . attention increases the clearness of the sensations attended to, but it is very difficult to describe what is meant by clearness in a way that shall make it more easily understood." pp. 1-2.

See the quotation in Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 17 from which the following brief statement is taken. "As far as accurate observation and unequivocal report are concerned, an observer is adequate only to those aspects of a given experience which the determining tendency brings clearly into line with the particular *Aufgabe* of the moment; other aspects of that experience fall at various distances outside the sphere of immediate observation and hence cannot be made objects of scientific description." The quotation is taken by Eaton from a paper by Dr. C. C. Pratt, entitled, "The Present Status of Introspective Technique," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXI, No. 9, April 24, 1924. Reference is also made to the psychologists of the Würzburg school and particularly to Külpe, "Versuche über Abstraktion" in *Bericht ü. den Kongress f. exper. Psychologie*, 1904, pp. 56-69.

The literature on the subject in English is largely under the influence of sensational psychology and suggests that the effect of attention is to intensify the different selected elements. This intensification is all that I need for what I have called selection.

A further point on which I would not agree with the views presented by those who have been dealing with this material is the validity of their concept of objective factors in attention. Loud noises, and other intense stimuli, it is held, compel attention. I think McDougall suggests the proper answer. Neither intensity nor suddenness of the stimulus commands attention, but curiosity or fear arising from the stimulus. The efficacy of the objective factors depend on the subjective factors, i. e. interests. See McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 272-273.

is related to many other events. The selection of one relation out of these possible relations is determined by an interest. A hammer is a simple instrument which is normally used to drive nails. Yet in case of need it may also be used to hold open a door, it may serve as a counterweight, its handle may be used as a lever, it may be of assistance in cracking nuts, etc. The way in which the hammer is used will depend on the interest which happens to be uppermost in one for whom it is present? The associations which we make between events are due to just such interest factors.⁵ One event takes its place in a different context as our interest so determines. The normal meaning of hammer is an instrument that is used to pound nails. But hammer may also mean an object to hold open a door, a counterweight, a nut-cracker, etc. The use made of an object depends on the particular interest which happens to be uppermost at the moment. Ward has pointed out that this choice of organization makes it imperative that some interest or practical motive be present as a basis of selection, for in its absence there would be no organization at all. "The centrality and organization", he says, "—I intend the words to be taken very literally—which all concrete experience manifests, could never arise to a merely cognitive subject; not to us, if our intellective were independent of our practical powers."⁶ Stout also suggests that what we call

⁵ Cf. McDougall, op. cit., pp. 394-6; Wheeler, "Attention and Association", *The Psychological Review*, pp. 7, 16-17, Vol. XXXV, 1928. See also Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 319-320; Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, "If, then, a phenomenon admits of a complete mechanical explanation, it will admit of an infinity of others, that will render an account equally well of all the particulars revealed by experiment." p.181; Mackey, *California Publications*, No. X, p. 71.

⁶ Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 134, Cf. Bradley, *Logic*, "Real assertions and denials . . . are made always with some intention and never apart from a certain interest. We have a reason always why we make them, and this "reason why" is a ground which never fails to qualify our original position." pp. 666-667; Lewis, op. cit. p. 136. "A mind for which, whatever happened, nothing could be done about it, could possess no knowledge, either of generalization or of objects." Yet, see Santayana, *Scepticism and Ani-*

a thing has an identity which is based on interest rather than structure. Permanence of interest rather than permanence of structure is the basis of identity of objects.⁷ Lewis points out a doctrine that was a favorite with Royce—that our categories, or concepts, are dependent on our modes of action.⁸ Were our modes of action different, we would have a different set of categories. In the organization of particular objects it seems that our interests are a significant factor the neglect of which only leads to a misconception of the nature of objects themselves.

III

But interests cut deeper into knowledge than we have so far considered. Objects are not only organized in the light of prevailing interests, but they are also explained or made intelligible under the same influences.

The problem of explanation is too broad to be dealt with at length in this treatise, but its ramifications are so broad and bear on the subject so intimately that I will offer a few remarks.

In the broadest sense we explain a fact when we state it in terms of objects which are more familiar to us.⁹ If the familiarity is strong enough, the matter of simplicity or complexity does not enter into the situation. I may explain to my boy how a steam engine works by pointing out the similarity of its action to that of a boiling tea kettle, or I may explain to a railroad engineer why compressed air is warm by

mal Faith, p. 68, "If they are ever to *see* what they see, they must in a manner stop living—"

⁷ Stout, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, pp. 140-149. Cf. Brown, *Creative Intelligence*, p. 157.

⁸ *Mind and the World Order*, pp. 101-102. See also the article of Royce in *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, pp. 102-135. The late Professor Mead called a perception a collapsed act. Cf. *The Journal of Philosophy*, "Psychology and Scientific Method", Vol. IX, 1912, p. 401.

⁹ Cf. Campbell, *What is Science?*, pp. 77-82.

referring him to certain more complex processes familiar to him on the steam engine. It is now recognized that scientific explanation depends to some extent on the preferences of the scientist. Aliotta¹⁰ suggests that the ideation of the scientist may play a significant part in the choice of explanatory concepts. This may be illustrated by physical theories. In a recent article¹¹ it has been suggested that men whose interest is fundamentally along mathematical lines have preferred to hold to the simpler Euclidian geometry, and to introduce physical assumptions to account for the empirical divergencies; while the physicists prefer to have a more complex mathematics and to eliminate the added physical assumption necessary to adjust the Euclidian geometry to the observed phenomena. The mathematicians prefer the simpler mathematical theory, the physicists prefer the simpler physical theory; each makes the adjustment in the sphere in which he is not so familiar. The choice of mathematics and of physical theory is an expression of the degree of familiarity of the different theories to the different men. One might almost say that Bradley does not find a concept satisfactory unless he has proved that it involves a contradiction or that Dewey is dissatisfied with an idea until he has related it to social reform or future consequences.

But not all explanation is merely a reduction to the familiar. There are other canons and criteria. Simplicity has always functioned as significant. We explain the complex when we reduce it to certain simple elements. These simple elements may be a universal law, such as that of gravitation, or of simple underlying entities such as atoms, or of spiritual

¹⁰ *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 390. Aliotta refers to Duhem who makes the suggestion. See also Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, pp. 210-222.

¹¹ Blumberg and Feigl, "Logical Positivism," *The Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. XXVIII, No. 11, 1931, p. 290. See also Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, "and we think we understand it because we know what impact is in itself; why? Simply because we have often seen a game of billiards." p. 142.

beings. The universal law of gravitation, or its counterpart as found in Democritus, is a statement of simple theory which is satisfactory to one who seeks a certain type of physical explanation. Yet Epicurus found it convenient to introduce his 'swerve' into such a system to give a place for volition and freedom which seemed to him required by a theory of ethics with which he was primarily concerned.¹² Our Calvinistic forefathers interpreted events in theological terms. Abundance of harvest was evidence of the goodness of God; tribulation, thwarting of cherished plans, was the opposition of the Devil. Today poor crops are traced to natural causes, lack of rain, poor soil, conditions which are studied; and remedied if possible.¹³ This may be summarized by stating that our various explanatory devices are attempts to make the world more intelligible to us. But what is intelligible varies with the interests and purposes of individuals and of groups.¹⁴

IV

The object so far dealt with has consisted of only two elements, the sensory and the formal or organizing element. We are inclined to treat meanings and concepts as dealing only with the cognitive aspects of experience. Yet this certainly is a mistake. Our emotional attitudes are as much a part of our organized experience as are those elements called cognitive. Failure to take account of just these affective elements is what vitiates the value of most theories of meaning. There is far greater misunderstanding which arises in com-

¹² Cf. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, pp. 320-323.

¹³ For a contrast between a modern and the Puritan view of the world with the corresponding application of significant categories, see Schneider, *The Puritan Mind*, pp. 10-11. See Hobbes' criticism of divine revelation, *Leviathan*, Pt. III, Chap. XXXII.

¹⁴ Cf. Lewis, op. cit., "Thus the ascription of intelligibility and unintelligibility is always relative—relative to our present powers and relative to those interests which make interpretation in some particular way momentarily important and desirable." p. 227.

munication of meaning by a failure to recognize that one person has a different weight, or value, attached to a term than the fact that our terms fail to indicate the same spatio-temporal object. 'Father' or 'mother', as terms, have a connotation vastly different to one who has been brought up in a happy home than to one whose parents were selfish and quarrelsome. To reduce the reference of terms strictly to the biological, social, or legal relationship is to miss the point of the significance and reference of the term. Our cognitive attitudes cannot be separated, except in abstraction, from our effective or value elements. An object has sensory and formal structure; it also includes our attitudes and sentiments which have arisen in experience in conjunction with them.

If an object is to be objective in the sense that I have given to that term, it follows that the condition for such objectivity is a common interest between those concerned.

Let us consider first of all objects of everyday experience, like tables and chairs. They seem to have little of this affective element. Value, or interest, seems to be at a minimum if not altogether negligible. It is at this level that pointing, (if both persons share the meaning in common¹⁵) serves to give a common object and renders the meaning of another intelligible. It is suggested that the element of value or interest is not so thin as first glance may indicate. It is just in this sphere that we act in close cooperation with others from practical necessity. If one is to be at all effective in ordinary contacts with others, if one expects even to do no more than earn a plain living, he must deal with picks and shovels and street-cars as others deal with them. The interests involved in that catch-all term 'self-preservation' function definitely in the manipulation and in the significance given to these objects. It is just such an interest which is most

¹⁵ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

universal.²⁰ Many people are not interested in art, but artists must live. The universality of such an interest tends to conceal its presence. One does not know that he has a thumb until he cuts it; similarly we are not conscious of many interests until attention is called to them by some unaccustomed contrast. In time of peace the common interests of a nation fall into the background, and minor interests of groups within the nation become prominent in marked contrast to the consciousness of common interest so evident in time of war. But the consciousness of common interest in war is evident in contrast to the opposing interest of the enemy. The generality of the common interest in ordinary objects permits us to give the same weight to the same groups of facts. This is the basis of common agreement in judgments that deal with them. Yet we tend to neglect altogether the interest which is operating, and to assume that a purely cognitive attitude, devoid of all interest, gives us a true picture of the world.

But let me pursue the matter a little further. It is not a fact that we take an attitude, consciously purely cognitive, even toward common objects. I cannot drive an automobile for two years without falling into the attitude of considering it much as I would a faithful horse, or even, possibly, a friend whose outstanding quality is his dependability. It is easy to regard with particular fondness a chair which happens to be built just to suit my body. When one sits in it, he feels it is somehow welcoming him. These attitudes are not universal. I like one chair because it happens to be adapted to my needs; my wife likes another because it happens to be adapted to hers. These attitudes are private and subjective. Yet, for the person having them, they constitute part of his concept of the chair or the automobile.

²⁰ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part III, Prop. VI.

There are attitudes which are more universal and general. Kant elaborated a theory of aesthetic judgment on just this distinction. Certain affective qualities are attributed to the object—their beauty—as contrasted with the pleasing qualities which are subjective or less general. While the critics may differ about the artistic values of modernisms revealed through the brush of Gauguin, or the chisel of Epstein, there is general agreement that a well proportioned elm-tree is restful, and that a sunset, bedecked with brilliant hues, is gorgeous. These qualities, being general, are regarded as objective. They are part of the meaning of the terms elm and sunset. The person who does not experience them is regarded as defective. He may be color-blind, or he may, we say rather apologetically, just lack a 'sense' for such things. The point I want to make is that one cannot omit from our concepts and meanings these affective qualities. If they are universal, they are objective; if private, they are subjective. But in either case, one cannot neglect this element of the object and still make intelligible to one's self the conduct of the person who so feels toward the object. My fondness for an old suit of clothes is unintelligible to my wife. With respect to that object, we do not have the same affective attitude; toward it we do not acknowledge the same scale of values.

So far, in this section, I have tried to present the bearing that interests have on the elements which function in knowing. What I have said may be summarized by stating that interests (a) select from the sensory manifold certain elements: (b) that they also select the related factors on which our objects are organized; (c) they determine those significant concepts in terms of which we seek to explain our world and make it intelligible; and (d) they clothe our concepts and meanings of objects in the affective attitudes, neglect of which makes the conduct of one with respect to the significant object unintelligible to another.

V

This analysis of the relation of interest or value to cognition suggests a partial answer to the problems from which I started. Two persons fail to agree when presented with the same 'data' because their interests are different. There is an assumption involved in the use of the term 'facts' or 'data' which must be called into question. It is assumed that facts are the same for everybody, they are objective and universally significant. It is just this assertion that my analysis has called into question. The objectivity of the 'facts' is not so obvious if no facts can be found independent of any interest. These interests or values are a third dimension which gives them weight. The same evidence is weighed differently by different persons because their interests are divergent. The result is that the same 'facts' do not produce the same conclusion in persons who acknowledge different interests. To put it the other way, the only condition under which the same 'data' produce the same results is that the persons giving them consideration have some interest in common for which that evidence is relative and significant. The problem as to the divergence of conclusions secured from judging about given material is solved when it is observed that the evidence is not independent of the valuing elements in cognition, which may vary from individual to individual. Divergence of interests produces divergence of result. It also follows that commonness of interests tends toward common agreement.

The same inseparable interconnection between value and the other elements in cognition suggests a partial solution to the other problem: why does each person think his own solution should be valid for others? The injection of interest into the cognitive situation makes for the organization of experience in terms of value or importance. The material selected, its organization, and the explanation which seems to make it intelligible, are all controlled by these value ele-

ments. Now it seems to be the psychological nature of value to make this importance loom large in the mind of the individual in whom the interest operates. Without the operation of such an interest his knowledge would seem shallow and insignificant. It is from this fact, I believe, that the claim for objectivity arises. The element of value, or importance, makes it impossible, or at least difficult, for one to realize that others do not accept the same values. Their failure to come to the same agreement is unintelligible; they are somehow perverted, obstinate, wicked, or just unreasonable." This is the natural attitude which one takes to others who differ fundamentally with respect to the main organization in knowledge. The importance or value significance of the knowledge for the individual is confused with its general validity for others.

This mistake is one which is psychologically natural, but which if unobserved and unchecked makes for intolerance and bigotry. It is just this difficulty which indicates the practical significance of some concept which will act as an antidote for it. The natural tendency to dogmatism should be hauled out into the light of clear criticism, and given a definite theoretical recognition. It is just this function which I suggest that 'social objectivity' may perform. It suggests that a judgment is not to be regarded as generally valid unless it seems to be intelligible and significant to myself and others as well. Subjective importance is not objective validity, but merely the evidence of the operation of a subjective interest. Objective validity comes when my views find acceptance by others. Shortly I shall turn to the further analysis of the concept of social objectivity, but before doing so, I shall attempt to illustrate what I am driving at by several illustrations.

¹¹ Cf. "The secret urge of self-importance leads everybody to overvalue any monopoly of knowledge or ability which he possesses." Hobson, *Economics and Ethics*, p. 61.

VI

This analysis suggests that there are three attitudes which may be taken toward our own judgments. I shall call these (a) objective dogmatism, (b) subjective dogmatism, and (c) social agreement.

(a). Objective dogmatism is the attitude which assumes that the knowledge which is organized in the light of one particular interest is a revelation of the ultimate structure of things and is, therefore, significant and valid for others. It fails to take account of the fact that others may disagree and yet be sincere in their disagreement. It maintains its point by disparaging at some point the attitude of the other person. In religious thought the disbeliever is a heretic; in philosophy he is a 'modernist' and unintelligible.

As an example of this view, I will suggest that of Professor Urban which is presented in his recent work *The Intelligible World*. He recognizes more definitely than any one whose writings I have examined, the interrelations between meaning and value, and the danger, either of separation, or of placing some one interest, in a dominating position. Yet he seems to fall into the same pit away from which he has so carefully warned others.

He points out quite clearly in Chapter III—a chapter which should become one of the classics in American philosophy—that the absolute idealists and the realists have a logic which is forged for the particular interest with which each is concerned. Although Professor Urban seeks to gain a vantage point far above petty party lines, when one examines his own position, one is struck by the exhibition of a certain dogmatism. His concept of intelligibility is one which seems to be quite illuminating. But he exhibits in his detailed examination of what is intelligible and what is not, a curious provincialism.¹⁸ Those views which seem related to interests other than

¹⁸ Follow, e. g., the references to 'Moderism' in the index. Cf. the follow-

his own are labelled modernism, and are all exhibitions of a perversion of the natural bent of the human mind.

Professor Urban seems to be put in a peculiar situation. He contends that there is an intrinsic intelligibility; the mind is naturally oriented in a certain direction. The evidence he brings is that the classic philosophers have always indicated this natural bent. (I will not quarrel with him on this point, but one might mention the classic materialisms as an exception.) Now, in this present age, suddenly, we are found with a whole host of unintelligible philosophies on our hands. The problem which should occupy Professor Urban, it would seem to me, would be to inquire into the cause of this sudden perversion of the natural bent of our minds. But he does not do so. Rather he merely insists that the other views are unintelligible and lets the matter rest there. His insight into the relation between value and meaning is lost. He sets up one interest as ultimate and final. This is his own. Those views which are not compatible with it are modernistic and unintelligible. He maintains his own position by a dogmatism which is based on the certainty and importance he feels for his own point of view. It is not the assurance that says, "This is 'true for me' in spite of what others say". It is rather that the other men are just plain wrong. In this zeal to establish a final and significant philosophy Urban has lost the real value of the insight that values are inseparably related to our

ing: Clarke states that certain relations, etc., appear necessary to all intelligent beings "except those only, who understand things to be what they are not, that is, whose understandings are either imperfect, or very much depraved." Rand, *Classical Moralists*, p. 313. One of the clearest recognitions of this 'objective dogmatism' I have noticed is found in Bentham's writings. Referring to different exponents of ethical theory he says, "The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out, and says, 'I am of the number of the Elect: now God himself takes care to inform the Elect what is right: and that with so good effect, that let them strive ever so, they cannot help not only knowing it, but practising it. If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me. . . .'" Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chap. II, Sect. XIV, n. Taken from Rand, *The Classical Moralists*, p. 491.

concepts, and that intelligibility is achievable by the acknowledgment of common values. Intelligibility is a relative, not an absolute concept. It is related to our interests and values. As one's interests differ, so will the concepts in terms of which our world is to be made intelligible to us.

The characteristic of what I have termed objective dogmatism is that (1) one confuses subjective certainty arising from the presence of a private interest as objectivity valid for others, and (2) the utter failure to understand why others do not accept this same position. The explanation of this failure on the part of others is generally attributed to perversity, moral or philosophical, etc., according to the field in which the difference falls.

(b). One may become conscious of this tendency to objective dogmatism, and face more squarely the fact that others do not agree with one's own pronouncements. Yet the value element so predominates that the position will not be given up. It is then that tendency to fall back on the attitude 'it is true for me' comes in. This is what I call 'subjective dogmatism'. It is subjective because the claim of validity no longer involves others; yet it is dogmatism for it confuses value,—significance—and certainty with truth. I will illustrate this attitude from a reference to the writings of Bradley. It shows how far one may go when pressed by the fact of disagreement.

Bradley's theory of truth and reality are too well known to require extended exposition for illustrative purposes. The criteria of non-contradiction and of positive coherence and comprehensiveness are such as make them binding on all intelligent persons. Bradley applied them with a dialectical skill unequalled since the days of Abelard, or even Parmenides. Yet in spite of the claim for universality which he thought he could validly claim for his results, he was faced with the obvious fact that they were not accepted by many

capable thinkers. In view of such a situation what could a man do? He could question the validity of his analysis, or, he could drop back on a subjective position which takes the position that my theory is, at least, 'true for me' regardless of what others think about the matter. Bradley followed the second of these alternatives.

The passages—they cover about two pages—where this is brought out clearly are too long to quote completely. I will extract a few lines to indicate the view I am pointing out:

"My critics", says Bradley,¹⁰ "may perceive and may even comprehend this alleged incompatibility, but to my mind the incompatibility does not exist. . . . But the whole of your contention rests to my mind on misconception and prejudice, while its assumption of knowledge as to what is possible seems to me even ridiculous. What I mean by truth and reality is that world which satisfies the claim of the Universe present in and to what I call my self. Here is the one criterion, and to me no other criterion is possible. This satisfaction, I am sure, implies that the Universe immanent in myself is present also otherwise and elsewhere. The Reality therefore I take to have this character, and, though I cannot understand how it is so, I find no reason in my want of comprehension. Thus by the radical incompatibility, of which my critics speak, I am not moved. For they themselves made their own difficulty because they have begun by falsifying the nature of things."

Now the problem that one should deal with in such a situation is this: if, in Bradley's terms, the same reality is otherwise and elsewhere, why does it not produce the same result, say, at Cambridge, as it does at Oxford? It is the failure to deal with just such a problem that gives rise to a certain subjective dogmatism altogether incompatible with the broadness of mind that should accompany philosophic vision. The alternative to falling back on a dogmatic subjectivism is to make social objectivity an additional criterion of truth, if not part of the nature of truth itself.

(c). In face of the fact of disagreement there is still a third attitude one may take. A judgment may appeal to me personally. Yet, however important and significant it may

¹⁰ Bradley, *Essays in Truth and Reality*, pp. 412-414.

seem to me, if others fail to find it so, its validity for purposes of truth is subject to suspicion. One significant test of logical validity is agreement on the part of others. If one's own view, in spite of the strength of its private appeal, does not seem significant and valid to others, it is probably unjustified. This willingness to put one's own views to the test of agreement is well illustrated by that good democratic Thomas Jefferson. In a letter written in 1811 to Duane, a newspaper editor who had broken with the Republican party, he states;

"I think an Editor should be independent, that is, of personal influence, and not be moved from his opinions on the mere authority of any individual. But, with respect to the general opinion of the political section with which he habitually accords, his duty seems very like that of a member of Congress. Some of these indeed think that independence requires them to follow always their own opinion, without respect for that of others. This has never been my opinion, nor my practice, when I have been of that or any other body. Differing, on a particular question, from those whom I know to be of the same political principles with myself, and with whom I generally thought and acted, a consciousness of the fallibility of the human mind, and of my own in particular, with a respect for the accumulated judgment of my friends, has induced me to suspect erroneous impressions in myself, to suppose my own opinion wrong, and to act with them on theirs. The want of this spirit of compromise, or of self-distrust, proudly, but falsely called independence, is what gives the federalists victories which they could never obtain, if these brethren could learn to respect the opinions of their friends more than of their enemies, and prevents many able and honest men from doing all the good they otherwise might do."²⁰

The essence of social objectivity (a) is this willingness to place one's own views besides others and to accord to them a value approaching that which is given one's own. It also presupposes (b) a certain confidence in the sincerity of other persons in contrast to that distrust so evident in what I have called objective dogmatism.

²⁰ Jefferson, *Works*, Vol. II, p. 196. See also Burt, *Principles and Problems in Right Thinking*, pp. 229-231. Trevelyn, *England in The Age of Wyclif*, pp. 125-126; Brayshaw, *The Quakers*, Chap. XI.

VII

Perhaps a further word of explanation is necessary. By invoking general agreement as a significant factor in truth, I do not propose to eliminate those factors which have frequently been termed objective. These factors, which I have called ontological factors, will still remain in the truth situation as significant and necessary elements. My point would be to limit to truth those ontological factors which are sharable with other persons so that judgments involving them can receive general acceptance. I shall call this ontological factor in truth the correctness of judgment. A judgment to be true must be correct, but there may be judgments which are correct but not objective; they depend upon ontological factors in the experience of some individuals which others do not find in theirs; they are experiences which are private and non-sharable. This might be illustrated by reference to toothache. The judgment that a person has a toothache may be a correct judgment. Yet it may not be objective, as the facts on which the judgment is based are not sharable. I make a confession that in my younger days when for any reason I did not want to go with the rest of the family, it was a simple matter to invoke a toothache as an excuse for staying home. I was at that time making use of the fact that the judgment 'I have a toothache' was not socially objective. My folks, on the other hand, relying on my sincerity, recognized that I had available the facts on which the correctness of the judgment 'I have a toothache' could be based. Social objectivity is not intended to replace the significance of ontological objectivity, but rather to emphasize those ontological areas concerning which agreement can be secured.

The analysis so far seems to point to the need of a concept which avoids objective dogmatism, which seems to impose on others a judgment which is significant only for the person who has it, and also avoids subjective dogmatism,

which still clings to subjective value as a basis for logical validity. The concept of 'social objectivity' seems to offer such a solution. It recognizes the place of individual interest, yet it stresses the fact that only that knowledge organized in the light of common interest can claim validity for other persons. It avoids the pitfalls of these two points of view and yet retains what elements of significance they seem to have for a theory of truth. The nature and possibility of 'social objectivity' will now be considered at greater length.

Chapter II

SOCIAL OBJECTIVITY

I

The conclusion of the previous chapter pointed toward the need of a concept which would cut across the older terms 'subjective' and 'objective', and which would combine certain features of both. This concept is 'social objectivity' which has as its correlative term 'private' experience. In this chapter I want to indicate (1) more fully the meaning I want to give to the term; (2) the fact that the term is not entirely new, its theoretical and practical significance having already been noted in several spheres of thought, and (3) to indicate certain features of communication on which the possibility of 'social objectivity' depends.

The term objectivity is widely used. But when one asks what 'objectivity' means, a strange variety of answers greets the inquiring mind. It may mean that the object is ontologically independent of the knowing mind. Montague insists that even meanings must be objective in this sense, else there would be no identity of meaning.¹ A further variation of this position is that the object is 'objective' if it somehow compels or determines the subject as in sense perception² or even in thought. Bosanquet was fond of asserting that reality is what the object compels us to think. Again it may refer to the distinction between the subject and the object. Any element to which a knowing being as subject pays attention is objective in this sense.³ For Kant, to be objective was synonymous with

¹ *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 353. See also Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 202.

² Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 162.

³ Cf. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 18; Santayana, *op. cit.* p. 203.

being necessary and universal.⁴ Then, too, objectivity has been equated with externality. What takes place inside the organism is subjective, but what is external and outside the organism is objective. Or a variation of the foregoing is to substitute mind for organism and make anything which falls outside of the mind objective;⁵ and to consider anything mental as subjective. Somewhat closely related to this is the distinction between what is public and what is private.⁶ The public is objective in this sense; the private is subjective. Those various meanings overlap. Yet the distinctions are significant enough to be separately pointed out. They certainly indicate that the term objectivity covers a number of meanings which need clearer definition before confusion in using the term is to be cleared.

Following along from the last suggestion, objectivity, as it applies to knowledge, may mean what a group of normal people may agree on when confronted with the same situation. It is knowledge arrived at in a process eventuating in agreement.⁷ This is social objectivity.

It will make for further clarity if I elaborate this latter meaning of objectivity. Private objects are those that (a) arise or have their sources within the organism, or (b) which

⁴ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Smith. Tr. "Since the universality and necessity of the rule would not be grounded 'a priori' but only on induction, they would be merely fictitious and without genuine universal validity." p. 223.

⁵ Cf. Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, pp. 133, 134, 139, 141, 229.

⁶ Norman Kemp Smith confuses two types of objectivity in one sentence. "If what we experience is in any degree and respect public and not private, independently real and not merely subjective, then, however partially and distortedly it is apprehended, we may by indirection find in its appearances data sufficient for truer apprehension." *Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge*, p. 229. Cf. Troland, *Problems of Psychology*, pp. 97-98.

⁷ Ward, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 18. For further meanings see Ducasse, "A Liberalistic Theory of Truth," *Phil. Rev.* 1925, Vol. XXXIV, p. 591; Lewis, *Mind and World Order*, pp. 120, 126, 127 ff.; Lossky, *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, pp. 134, 139, 141, 229; Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, pp. 90, 138, 139; Enriques, *The Problems of Science*, pp. 21.

have their source either within or without the organism, but by reason of individual variations within the organism unique objects are presented. I have already suggested that sensory experiences such as toothache are of this nature. Some have thought to make compulsion or coerciveness the test of objectivity. Barry,⁸ for example, suggests that coerciveness is what constitutes a fact. Yet he makes a distinction between such experiences as are private and those which are general. Alexander also holds that we must distinguish between objects which are private and those which are public. The former are objective, but are not real;⁹ the latter are both real and objective. The point to these illustrations is that to brand an event as private does not make it subjective in the sense that it is cut off from the whole world, or that it is amenable to the whim and fancy of the subject. I cannot make myself have a toothache whenever I feel like it unless I commit certain objective acts. Yet it is true that there are certain objects which I can control much more than others. I can imagine, within limits, objects which you do not experience, and I myself taking certain attitudes of liking or disliking which you do not take. It is in these latter cases that the emphasis has been laid on the subjective. Yet to place the dividing line at any one particular place is arbitrary. I can infer the presence of electrons in a physical object. They depend on certain determinate conditions. Yet, for present purposes, it seems advisable to hold as private all those experiences which are inadequately sharable with others, and to hold those objects to be public about which there is common agreement after excluding these private differences.

The problem arises; granted the presence of these private experiences, how do we get common, or objective, objects?

⁸ Barry, *The Scientific Habit of Thought*, pp. 95-96, 138.

⁹ Alexander, "Collective Truth and Willing", *Mind*, 1913, Vol. XXVII, p. 23.

The answer seems to be that the only means we have of finding out our own peculiarities is by comparison of our experience with that of others. A dream may be vivid, and may, seemingly, involve the presence of other people. Its subjectivity and privacy can only be ascertained by consultation with others to see if they had such an experience.¹⁰ This process in which private elements are eliminated has been recognized and described by several men, but no one has made out the case better than Kant from whom I quote:

"But under the *sensus communis* we must include the Idea of a communal sense, i.e. of a faculty of judgment, which in its reflection takes account *a priori* of the mode of representation of all other men in thought; in order *as it were* to compare its judgement with the collective Reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising from the private conditions that could be so easily taken for objective, which would injuriously affect the judgement."¹¹

An object to become 'objective' must go through a social process of verification. It is checked with the experiences of others by means of communication with others, or of observation of their behavior in coöperative activity. It is only such a process that will reveal the individual idiosyncrasies and peculiarities which must be eliminated.

It may be objected that such a process does not eliminate the subjective factors at all. It may be that there are 'idiosyncrasies' which all share in common. I can only reply that if this is the case the term 'idiosyncrasy' no longer has any meaning. It is a term that must apply within the group and not to the group as a whole. It is like a law. If everyone

¹⁰ Campbell, *What is Science?*, p. 22. This is also true of color blindness and similar defects.

¹¹Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by Bernard, p. 170; see also Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 35; Barry, *op. cit.* p. 112; Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Lewis, *Mind and the World Order*, pp. 75, 139; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, pp. 170-171; Santayana suggests that we are made aware of truth by the liar. See *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 266.

disobeys it, it is no longer law. It should also be noted that this account of the objectivity of the object is not the attempt, now I hope generally discarded in modern thought, of seeking to state the nature of the object, which, by definition, we cannot know. It does not attempt to state the nature of an object as it enters into the experience of no human being, but rather as it enters into the experience of the normal human being. If it be objected that there are still subjective elements in our objective object, I can only say that the attempt to eliminate such elements altogether makes a travesty of the whole knowing situation.¹²

It has been supposed that all sensory experience must be excluded from knowledge because by its nature it is private." I do not see that this is necessary. It is granted at once that there is no way of proving that our sensory experiences are the same. There seems to be no test that one can make to prove that when you smell a rose your concrete experience of smelling brings to you just the same qualities which it does to me. Yet there does not seem to be any evidence to suggest that it may be different. Yet if evidence in physiology were

¹² "The awareness of centaur meaning is fanciful, not simply because part of its conditions lie within the organism; part of the conditions of *any* perception, valid as well as invalid, scientific as well as aesthetic, lie within the organism". Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 322. One may look at the matter in another way, and Hoernlé suggests that when the co-operation of the object is necessary for production of the experience, the object then is 'real'. Art. entitled "Image, Idea, and Meaning", *Mind*, Vol. XVI, 1907, p. 95. In either case a valid or objective object involves extra and intra-organic elements. See further Lossky, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, pp. 96-100.

¹³ If it is suggested that our reactions are different, it seems possible to account for many of our minor likes and dislikes as a function of our social training. (I have two children who are enthusiastic over cod liver oil. It is 'Bottled Sunshine', a term that is always mentioned in tones pitched as pleasingly as possible.)

One might reverse the whole situation and take the position that we react alike to the same qualia, but an apple to me tastes like a plum to you. You like apples and I like plums. Yet it seems that there is sound sense in taking the former position. It is simpler to assume that the qualia are the same and to account for the minor likes and dislikes by other means.

to come forth showing that the ultimate sensory experience were different only a part of the view which I have suggested need be laid aside. The objective object would then discard the peculiar qualia just as it has already discarded other personal idiosyncrasies. The upper limit of this process of discarding seems to be that of the relational pattern of the experiences. If the experiences are different, and the order or pattern remains the same, as human beings, we will still be able both to communicate and to cooperate without any difficulty. The minimum of common experience necessary for a common social world seems to be a world of spatial and temporal relations which are the same for all human beings.¹⁴

The point that I want to insist on in this section is that the object that we have in common, like a tree or a house, is an object which is gained by social intercourse. It is taken over by the individual and used as if it were a private experience. To remember the conditions for its appearance will aid us later in one of the objections which is readily brought against the view that truth is a product of a social process. I want to insist that between the concepts of the ontologically subjective and ontologically objective there is a significant category which I shall call the socially objective.

II

This meaning of 'objective' is neither new nor original. Its use for theoretical purposes by Alexander and others has already been pointed out. Its use in practice is even more widespread than its recognition in formal theory. I want to point out briefly instances of its use in several fields of knowledge.

Social psychology has for some time recognized the essentially social nature of man. The subjective logic of individual

¹⁴ Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 208; Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Kant made a common world of space and time, (although subjective in his sense) the condition of further knowledge.

certainty is based on a psychology which regards the self as an isolated unit. This is emphasized in those theories that make subjective certainty, intuition, etc., criteria for truth.¹⁵ The corresponding theory that would follow from a more social viewpoint would be that truth-achieving is a co-operative enterprise, just as much as the achievement of personality or of an intricate economic organization. Creighton has definitely recognized the implications of his organic theory in just this respect. In an article published in 1916¹⁶ entitled "The Social Nature of Thinking" he stresses this implication, although he does not deal with the particular problem that such a view would involve. The fact that thinking proceeds in such a co-operative fashion is, of course, widely recognized.

Royce, too, has done much to stress the social nature of man, and the corresponding logical recognition of its implications are presented in the third conception of being in his Gifford Lectures. The realm of validity, I take it, is in effect this realm of communication, and "meanings do not come into being without language, and language implies two selves in conjoint and shared undertaking".¹⁷

This social objectivity has been recognized in other fields of thought. Moralists have always been concerned with the extent to which moral judgments have been accepted. This is indeed the meeting place of moralists who are far apart in many other respects. Green suggests that we check individual idiosyncracies in moral life "by constant reference to the expression of that experience which is embodied, so to speak, in the habitual phraseology of men, in literature, and

¹⁵ Croce, *Philosophy of the Practical*, pp. 92-93; Sigwart, *Logic*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁶ The article first appeared in *The Philosophic Review*, 1918 and has since been republished in *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*.

¹⁷ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 299 (Open Court Edition). Cf. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order*, pp. 70, 79-80. Burns, *The Contact Between Minds*, pp. 25, 39. Would we say the extent of the acceptance represents the depth of interest? Cf. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 111. Common reality is a social achievement.

in the institutions of the family and political life".¹⁸ And Sidgwick states that he would "rely less confidently on the conclusion set forth . . . if they did not appear . . . to be in substantial agreement . . . with the doctrines of those moralists who have been most in earnest in seeking among commonly received moral rules for genuine intuitions of the Practical Reason."¹⁹

This same concept may also be found in disguise in the social sciences. Economics, for example, has been puzzled at times in dealing with value theory to take proper account of the terms (a) value in use and (b) value in exchange. Value in use is a recognition of the subjective valuation of individuals arising from the particular economic situation in which they happen to be. Thus a quarter of a dollar does not have the same value in use for a millionaire as it has for a poor man, yet it has the same value in exchange. And, as one economist has suggested, "It is evident that, for human beings living in society as we do, the exchange value of an object is far and away more important than its value in use."²⁰ This exchange value, as contrasted with value in use, is only an example of social objectivity as it applies in the field of economic value theory.

Such a device may be expected in the moral and social sciences in which general principles seemed to be elusive and universality obtained only with a loss of content, but even in the physical sciences there are those who hold much the same attitude. Barry suggests that a fact is "a compulsory experience established by common agreement which is indicated by similar behavior with reference to it".²¹ In a little book,

¹⁸ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sect. 93.

¹⁹ Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 384.

²⁰ Gide, *Political Economy*, p. 221.

²¹ Barry, *The Scientific Habit of Thought*, pp. 95-96, 138.

which has not received the attention it deserves in this country, Campbell defines the content of physical science as that about which we can secure universal agreement. He sticks to the definition, on the whole, quite consistently.²²

In philosophy itself I believe that we may also observe a similar situation. No one, unless he is devoted at all costs to maintaining a pet theory, will deny that discussion serves to clarify thought, if it fails, as it almost always does, to convince. Publicity and discussion serves to set truth in order.²³ Dialectic was largely a process of conversation by means of which gradually the truth emerged into forms which were stable and generally accepted. This aspect of truth has been presented quite charmingly by Professor Fite in one of his recent essays. We get truth the same way we get a bargain, by a give and take process with other minds. We make our suggestion. It is accepted with modifications or rejected. We counter with another offer, and so on until agreement is reached.²⁴

A practical recognition of the significance of social objectivity may be found in the statements of a noted epistemologist whose recent publication is outstanding in the field.

"The practice of philosophizing *in vacuo*," says Lovejoy "I have always regarded with a distaste and suspicion. Philosophy seems to me essentially a collective and coöperative business. Effective coöperation among philosophers consists, it is true, primarily in disagreement. For, given a sufficiently well defined problem, philosophy can really get forward with it only by bringing together in their logical connection all the suggestions which have occurred, or are likely to occur, to acute

²² Campbell, *What is Science?* pp. 27, 29, 48. Yet he does say that agreement is potential and not consciously applied. Cf. pp. 38, 49.

²³ Hodder, "Truth and the Tests of Truth", *Philosophical Review*, 1896, Volume V, p. 22. Cf. Lovejoy, *Revolt against Dualism*, Philosophy is operative by disagreement, p. ix.

²⁴ Fite, *The Living Mind*, p. 139. The significance of space and time as explanatory devices. The ordering of the senses as higher and lower, etc. are other examples of the same tendency of stressing social nature of social objectivity. Cf. Strong, *Essays Natural Origin of Mind*, p. 1, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, Vol. II, p. 60, Trans. by McKeon.

and philosophically initiated minds as significantly pertinent to that problem."²⁵

In this practical manner the significance of social intercourse is recognized, although when it comes to his epistemological theory such a concept is not used.

All that I have tried to suggest in this section is that the category of social objectivity is found useful by men who work in fields as diverse as epistemology and physics. Some appeal to social objectivity without seeing its bearing on knowledge; others have consciously adopted the concept as their meaning of objectivity, and use it, as scientists, as a criterion to determine the material admissible to their field, e. g., Campbell in physics.

The dualism between subjective and objective has been variously conceived, but in the history of philosophy it has generally suggested a dualism which has been hard to bridge. Santayana's expression 'scepticism and animal faith' suggests one of the rather unsatisfactory methods of effecting a crossing; Descartes' appeal to God, and Locke's confusion in the fourth book of the *Essay* are also examples of similar failures. The dualism of private and subjective opinion as contrasted with knowledge and socially objective experience has the merit to suggest a definite concrete process, which may be empirically studied, of getting from what is subjective to what is objective. This process is communication. To certain aspects of it I now turn. Part of the merit of the proposed term social objectivity, is that it offers a concrete bridge across the chasm between the subjective and the objective; and it does not compel us to leap with the guidance of only 'animal faith.'

²⁵ *The Revolt Against Dualism*, pp. ix-x.

III

But one may grant the clarity of the concept and still take the position that it seems to suggest problems which are not capable of solution. Is it possible to see that the conception can be applied? I have just pointed out both its recognition and its use in several fields. The question I still suggest is: How is social objectivity possible? I am in much the same position that Kant was with respect to mathematics and science. These disciplines were expanding rapidly before his own eyes. What would be the implications of a position which accepted them as facts? Social objectivity, I have contended, is also in actual use. Its use is a fact. Then what are some of the relevant conditions which make it possible?

The answer is seemingly simple. Social objectivity is achieved through the process of communication. The seeming simplicity is soon dispelled as one seeks to go into the details of its nature. Of symbolism, and meaning, and mind—only a few of the significant factors in the process—we still know but little in any objective fashion. I do not propose to make any exhaustive analysis. I shall confine my remarks to those elements in the process which seem most significant for social objectivity. This will consist largely of a brief inquiry into the effect that interest has on the communicability of meaning.

Communication presupposes other minds. One who seeks to communicate does not doubt the existence of other minds. His speech betrayeth him. Similarly in knowledge one does not deny communication. For communication is the condition and presupposition of knowledge just as the assumption of other minds is the presupposition of communication.²⁶ Com-

²⁶ This does not imply that one cannot make communication or the knowledge of other minds an object of scientific observation as Urban suggests. Cf. *The Intelligible World*, p. 80. "Communication is, moreover, not itself an object of knowledge and explanation, but is rather assumed in all knowledge and explanation."

munication also implies that other minds have similar experiences which give a basis for a common reference and denotation. The nature of the common reference may be the scale starting from sensory experience²⁷ or even from similar value experiences²⁸ which passes down to such abstract and emotionless factors as a bare spatic-temporal system apparently devoid of all sensory or effective elements,²⁹ or a scheme of common organic behavior.³⁰

The use of language in communication has been compared to that of memory in the individual mind. As memory unites and brings together past experiences in the single center of experience, so communication unites the single centers of experience in a larger unity.³¹ Knowledge has its rise in the field of discourse.³² It also serves, as Dewey suggests,³³ as a gap between essence and existence. Essences are the fixed or permanent elements in language generally used to convey similar meanings. They are objective in the sense that they do not depend on the activity of any one individual. By the individual they are found in the social medium; they are not created. This is the basis for realism in the medieval meaning of the term. Yet they function as indicators and pointers. They are meaningless unless they refer to concrete experience. Hence they are related to existence. It is this double-barrel-

²⁷ E.g., such as Holt suggests, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 110.

²⁸ E.g., Urban, op. cit., pp. 263-4.

²⁹ This is in effect what the commonness of the world means for Lewis. Cf. op. cit., p. 103, 124. See also Blumberg and Feigl, "Logical Positivism", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1930, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 286-287.

³⁰ This would be the logical outcome of the behavioristic approach. Cf. Watson, *Psychology*, pp. 322ff.

³¹ Cf. Burns, *The Contact between Minds*, p. 92. This does not imply a group mind in the controversial meaning of that term.

³² Thought is in the process of communication. See Mackay, *Cal. Pub. in Phil.*, Vol. XI, 1929, p. 134.

³³ *Experience and Nature*, p. 167.

ed nature of language that gives rise to those terms so dear to the logician—intension and extension. The intensive aspect of a term is its ability to convey to another mind a meaning of significance. Yet the meaning so conveyed is empty unless it suggests concrete experience to the recipient."

IV.

As in the object, so in the meaning to be communicated, there will be three elements: (a) the sensory qualia, (b) the relational elements, and (c) the value elements. I shall consider these factors as they affect communication.

Holt insists that the sensory elements are communicable.⁸⁴ If all sensations were private, all communication would be impossible. Day and night are no more objective than pleasure or pain. Lewis⁸⁵ insists that there is no ultimate test by means of which one can tell whether when you smell a rose you have the same qualia as I have. In an ultimate sense the qualia *are* incommunicable. Yet that does not end the story. If I want to communicate to you the fragrance of a certain brand of perfume, I can say that it smells just like a certain variety of rose with which we are both familiar, or we can step out into the garden and I can select a rose which smells like the perfume, and you can smell it. While the immediate qualia cannot be communicated, the conditions under which they a-

⁸⁴ This twofold function of language to point out and refer to concrete experience and to convey a meaning has many implications for logic. Definition has tended to cover one of the functions to the exclusion of the other. Contradiction and the other laws of thought can be reinterpreted in the light of them. E.g., contradiction arises when a reference is ambiguous to the extent that it interferes with the purpose of the communication, or when the meanings and explanation cause confusion in the mind of the recipient. For recognition of this double aspect of all thought, see Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 286; Mackay, *California Publications in Philosophy*, No. X, p. 85; Morris, "The Prediction Theory of Truth", *The Monist*, Vol. XXVIII, 1928; Rogers, *What Is Truth?*, p. 72; Sigwart, *Logic*, p. 34; Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

⁸⁵ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 110.

⁸⁶ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 121, 124.

rise can be generally specified. The assumption underlying this procedure is that although we can't be sure that the same qualia are experienced by both of us, yet we can be sure that for each of us the same qualia will arise under the same conditions. We assume that the conditions which convey to me similar qualia, such as the rose and perfume, will also convey to you similar qualia, although the qualia may be different for each of us. This can be made a matter of empirical verification. I can say that these two objects give off the same odor. You can report whether they do or not. This correlation with conditions of the appearance of qualia seems to be as close as we can get to communicating them. Granted objective conditions, the qualia arising from those conditions should be similar. We use such an assumption and seem to have it verified in normal experience. The ultimate qualia may be ineffable, yet the conditions under which they arise may be made objective and this seems sufficient for communication.⁸⁷

It seems generally agreed that the relational elements of experience offer less ground for disagreement, and more ground for objectivity, than the sensory factors which have just been considered. As I write this, I hear a man nailing shingles on a roof. I have no way of conveying to another just the sound that his pounding causes to arise for me, yet I would have no difficulty in securing agreement about the temporal sequence of his pounding. The relational pattern is objective in a sense that the sensory element is not. We may neglect the sensory factors completely, yet act with respect to his pounding merely by considering its relational features. We may agree, for example, that we heard a cry of distress

⁸⁷ The exception arises in those cases where different capacities for discrimination are evident. A variation in the conditions does not bring about agreement on a corresponding change in the qualia. If I can specify what strawberries are ripe without touching them, while my friend can not, the solution is in the fact that he is red-green color blind. The evidence for such differences in discrimination can be made objective.

just before one of the rhythmic series of poundings—the sign of an experienced carpenter—began, and that just after he stopped we heard the bark of an excited dog.

Lewis defines his pure concept in just such relational terms.³⁸ These relational schema are just what two persons may have in common. The immediate qualia could be changed and no significant change in behavior would be noticed—provided the change were consistent—as long as the relational pattern remains the same.³⁹ The universality and objectivity of such relational patterns is the basis for that general acceptance and universality accorded to scientific law which is merely an extension and refinement of the relational pattern of ordinary experience more carefully abstracted from the empirical conditions under which it is found.⁴⁰

But there is still a further complication which arises in communication. Affective elements seem to be more private and subjective than sensory qualia. Yet it is a matter of common observation that we fail to understand each other just because of the presence of such elements. I take it that two persons do not really become intelligible to each other unless the value element attached to the objects of conversation or discussion approach a common level. Meaning cannot be separated from value.⁴¹ The attempt to do so is to

³⁸ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83, 171, 110.

³⁹ “—if one such (qualia) could be lifted out of the net work of its relations in the total experience of the individual, and replaced by another, no social interest or interest of action, would be affected by such a substitution.” *ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴⁰ See Campbell, *What Is Science?*, pp. 38ff.

⁴¹ This, it seems to me, is Urban's real contribution in *The Intelligible World*. I want to acknowledge the indebtedness for the suggestion, although I realize that I have desecrated the insight. The following from Whitehead, *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* is a statement of the view I am driving at. “This function of language (its emotional efficiency) depends on the way it has been used, on the proportionate familiarity of particular phrases, and on the emotional history associated with their meanings and thence derivatively transferred to the phrases themselves. If two nations speak the same language,

leave out part of the concrete reference of our terms and to neglect the one factor which goes farthest to account for our significant activity. It has been a commonplace that to move a person you must appeal to his emotions. While I agree with Lewis that the sensory qualia may be changed in the complete experience of an individual without significant change in his conduct, such assent is conditioned on the fact that he would still have the same emotional and value attitudes toward the objects after the transformation. It is just this failure to take account of the affective elements within the sphere of the concept itself that is the major defect of Lewis' presentation. His 'pure concept' is an abstraction found in the mind of no individual. He does suggest that in the mind of the individual the pure concept is correlated with the private qualia.⁴² But there is no pure concept apart from just such concrete experiences or 'correlations'. If such a view were to be pressed too far, the outcome would be that such a general or pure concept would be the object of no particular mind, but of mind or consciousness in general.⁴³ The implications of such a view have been too carefully worked out in the past one hundred and fifty years to need further comment at this time.

Strange as it may seem, it appears easier to find those who hold that emotion is in some sense communicable than those who hold a similar position about sensory qualia. Kant recognizes the communicable and social nature involved in the aesthetic judgment.⁴⁴ Goblots⁴⁵ suggests that emotion is

this emotional efficiency of words and phrases will in general differ for the two." p. 67.

⁴² Op. cit., p. 144.

⁴³ See Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, pp. 170-171.

⁴⁴ *Critique of Judgment*, "We could even define Taste as the Faculty of judging of that which makes *universally communicable*, without mediation of a concept, our feeling in a given representation." p. 173. See also pp. 174-175.

⁴⁵ "Elle est pourtant communicable, par l'effet de la sympathie; mais elle n'est pas universellement communicable." Edmond Goblots, *Traité de Logic*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1925.

communicable although not universally so; while Alexander and Burns take the position that there is direct enjoyment of processes of other minds.⁴⁶ Burns has dealt with the problem of 'the contact between minds' and insists that the cognitive aspect is only one of the significant types of contact.⁴⁷ Communication as cognitive, coöperation as conative, and sympathy as affective, are all significant types of communication of which we can be directly aware. The basis for the view that there is communication is an appeal to certain experiences of sympathy and insight which are not infrequent in like-minded groups.⁴⁸ Yet I think I prefer to use the approach and terminology of Urban. As he states it the condition for intelligible communication is the acknowledgment of common values.⁴⁹

The function that these valuative factors play in cognition is to assign a certain weight or significance to the observed facts.⁵⁰ Pointing may indicate the place we are to look and may indicate for each the sensa which will be presented, but the significance or weight to be given the observation will depend on our interest in or the value elements in the situation. Organization and sense qualia may be regarded as two

⁴⁶For Alexander's position see the article already referred to, "Collective Willing and Truth", *Mind*, Vol. XXII, 1913, pp. 17-21. He takes the same position in *Space, Time and Deity* with certain extensions, the chief of which is the relating of such rapport to a theory of instincts. Vol. II, pp. 31-37. Cf. Butler, *Sermons Upon Human Nature*, Ser. II, "Since, then, our inward feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally real; to argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth." Rand, *Classical Moralists*, p. 379.

⁴⁷Burns, *The Contact Between Minds*, pp. 55ff.

⁴⁸There may be circularity here. Perhaps what we mean by a like-minded group is that they have such experiences (among others) in common.

⁴⁹"The meanings of these existents and the meaning of existence itself are not describable; they can only be acknowledged in communication," *Intelligible World*, p. 239. 'Meanings' include the value elements.

⁵⁰"Divergences of opinion result in a large part from attaching different weight to various factors in a problem." Lowell, *Public Opinion in Peace and War*, p. 15, quoted by Follett, *Creative Experience*, p. 7.

dimensions of facts, but facts are tridimensional. The third dimension is the value element. Russell is said to have stated that no two philosophers understand each other. It is a common experience to have an enthusiast beseege us with a lot of information about his hobby, but somehow it leaves us cold. Hume remarked that Berkeley could not be refuted, but still no one believed him. It is such experiences which can be accounted for only by this third dimension to be attributed to facts—their value significance.

The conditions of effective communication require that this value element be about equal to those who are to communicate. As these value elements diverge the discourse becomes less and less intelligible, until the stage is reached at which there is not complete disagreement, but just a lack of intelligibility. What you consider of importance I do not, and vice versa. Effective communication can only be achieved between people who have interests which approach sufficiently close to allow the same approximate weight to the same body of sensory impressions and organized experience.

v

In this chapter I have tried (a) to suggest the meaning of the term 'social objectivity'; (b) to show that there is nothing radical in the concept itself by pointing out that it has already been used both theoretically and practically in several fields, and (c) to state some of the more important conditions on which the communication of intelligible meaning is possible.

With respect to its meaning, 'social objectivity' cuts across the meanings of subjective and objective as they are stated in classical literature since the days of Descartes and Locke. Sensory and affective experiences may be socially objective provided they are generally experienced and can be intelligibly communicated. In the older terminology these are by their nature subjective. It is part of the merit of the concept of

social objectivity that it is not cut off from its correlate of private experience, by a chasm which cannot be bridged by an observable process. The dividing line between them is constantly shifting as new means are devised for conveying accurate meanings to others, for then the subjective experience becomes objective and may be shared with others. The relationship between what is private and what is socially objective is actual and dynamic, not static and impossible. It is part of the problem of science to enter fields that have been the object of private opinion and to transform them into areas of socially objective knowledge.

The actual use of the concept of 'social objectivity' in theory and the operation of the process in practice has been indicated in the fields of epistemology, ethics, economics, and physics. The brief analysis which I have just made suggests that in some respects the process is susceptible to analysis. In particular, the operation of interests in cognition—dealt with more fully in the previous chapter—does not prove to be an insurmountable difficulty for communication. And if this most difficult factor in experience can be dealt with analytically and empirically, the more simple elements should also be susceptible to further analysis. Thus the concept of 'social objectivity' (a) can be given meaning; (b) can be shown as functioning to some extent already, and (c) lends itself to the hope that the process by which it is brought about may be carefully analyzed and made objective.

The significance of the term 'social objectivity' for our initial problem can now be more definitely stated. The reason that people differ may frequently be traced to the operation of divergent interests which guide the cognitive activity. The cause of the belief that others will accept one's conclusions is due to the presence of subjective value elements. What is important for me I think is important for others as well, and I feel that there is something wrong with them if they do

not agree with me. This leads to what I have called dogmatism. This dogmatism may be objective if I seek to maintain that my subjective valuations are 'true for others'. It is subjective dogmatism if I still cling to the importance of the cognition, but in the face of disagreement fall back on an attitude that the judgment is 'true for me'. The conditions under which one can expect others to accept a judgment as generally valid is now more clear. A judgment is valid and socially objective if established by social intercourse and communication.

The analysis of all the conditions which make for the social objectivity of judgments is beyond the scope of this paper. It suggests the more complex theory of truth at which I shall just hint shortly. The outcome of my analysis may be said to be: First, it suggests why two persons do not agree when presented with the 'same facts', which was the first problem dealt with. Second, it explains why, in the face of disagreement, a person still feels that others should agree with him. This was my second problem. Third, it points the direction in which one should go to get truths valid for others. In other words, it implies a theory of truth which is more complex than the classical theories which have analyzed truth throughout the history of philosophy.

Chapter III

CONCLUSION

I started this inquiry with the problem (a) why do men frequently differ when presented with the same facts and (b) yet why does each one feel that the other *ought* to accept his judgment as valid? The solution seems to be found in the interrelations between interests and knowledge. People differ when viewing the same data because their interests are different. This factor of value makes the judgment important and certain in the mind of one who experiences it. These subjective value factors are readily converted into claims for objective validity. They are regarded as binding on others.

Faced with the fact of disagreement, three attitudes may be taken: (a) Objective dogmatism is the view that my own subjective pronouncements are valid for others. The failure of others to accept them is a sign of perversity or depravity. (b) The view that my own pronouncements are 'true for me' is what I have called 'subjective dogmatism'. Subjective certainty is still equated with truth which has lost its claim to general validity. (c) The third attitude of 'social objectivity' avoids the disadvantage and preserves the advantage of these two methods. It recognizes the error of confusing truth with subjective certainty, yet it gives a basis of truth which is more than mere personal opinion.

The concept of social objectivity is used in the moral, social, and even the physical sciences, although epistemologists have taken little account of the fact. I have sought to point out its meaning and significance, and by a brief analysis of the process of communication to show how the process which it presupposes is possible.

From all this, what may be inferred? The following conclusions I propose as suggestions arising from this analysis for certain branches of philosophy.

I

The most immediate result will be the implications for truth and epistemology itself. If the classic theories of truth fail to deal with problems such as I have dealt with, some revision or expansion of them seems necessary. I think it will be obvious that this expansion will be in the direction of complexity. The simple analysis into idea, object, and correspondence, in spite of all that has been written about them, will be found to be oversimplified. I believe that a theory which will adequately deal with the elements presented will involve at least five elements as far as the individual mind is concerned. (The introduction of communication suggests as a minimum at least two minds in contact.)

These five factors I take to be (a) interest; (b) meaning; (c) intent or reference of meaning to content; (d) object, and (e) communication. The complications introduced by recognizing the part of interest in communication suggests a further set of categories, parallel in part to the foregoing. These are (i) intelligibility of meaning; (ii) correctness of judgment; (iii) social agreement. The interrelations of these two sets of categories may be shown as follows:

(a) Interest	$\left. \begin{array}{c} \text{i} \\ \text{Intelligi-} \\ \text{bility} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left. \begin{array}{c} \text{ii} \\ \text{Correctness} \\ \text{of} \\ \text{Judgment} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left. \begin{array}{c} \text{iii} \\ \text{Social} \\ \text{Agreement} \end{array} \right\}$
(b) Meaning			
(c) Act of Intent or Reference			
(d) Object			
(e) Communication			

The interrelation of the categories is obvious. Intelligibility is presupposed by correctness of judgment, which in turn is presupposed by social agreement: and (i) intelligibility of meanings involves (a) interests; (b) meanings, and (c) intent or reference; (ii) correctness of judgment includes intelligibility and (d) the ontological elements of the object; while

(iii) social agreement presupposes the foregoing and agreement secured through (e) communication.

It is my opinion that the problems of truth and knowledge may be more adequately dealt with by the foregoing group of concepts than those used by classical theories of truth. The definition of truth implied in such a view may be briefly stated as follows: "A judgment is true which is (i) intelligible to others because it is stated in concepts which are significant for common interests; (ii) which has been verified (or may be verified) as to ontological correctness by tests which are objective in character, and (iii) which is agreed upon as a result of communication between interested parties." I suggest this definition as a hypothesis. Its testing by solution of acknowledged problems of truth, and its wider recognition by those who are interested in the type of problem it deals with, will make it truth if it should be successful. One important result, then, of my inquiry has been a suggested hypothesis as to the nature of truth.

II

Further implications of the view I am suggesting point to changes in logical theory as well. Formal logic has made much of the proposition, but the proposition which engages so much thought is a bloodless affair which does not exist as vital in the intercommunication of thought. I would substitute significant reference to objects in the individual experience, and significant communication between persons in social experience, as objects more significant to attack for analysis than the propositions of classical logic. The reference to objects in individual experience is the *extensive* use of judgments, while their functioning in communication is their *intensive* use. The necessity and universality in judgments is derived from their social objectivity. This is a suggested solution to the old problem of nominalism and realism. Concepts are objective intensively. Their being is in and for dis-

course. Yet ontologically they are symbols for concrete reference, just as the nominalists have always insisted.

Following this line, the theory of definition will also call for revision. Definition will involve two functions: a pointing to objects in extensive reference, and a communication of meaning in intensive use. There is no abstract essence in the object to be defined. Different parts of it are significant as interests change, for the accuracy and intelligibility of the definition are relative to the prevailing interest. Similarly, the so-called laws of thought, which in some fashion have been held to partake of the structure of the world, can be restated in terms of their significant functioning in reference and communication. Extensively, one becomes involved in a contradiction if he uses the same symbol to refer to two different objects (and does not intend to do so); while intensively one is involved in a contradiction when the terms used in communication vary so much that they are unintelligible for other persons with whom one seeks to establish intellectual concord. The principle of self-contradiction, which has been thought to establish the truth of certain statements reflexive in nature, will be found capable of restatement in a more significant manner. I suggest that the significance of this reflexiveness is that no part of the knowing situation, involving all the complexity which I have suggested, can be denied without such a contradiction. This principle, then, instead of establishing the ultimate nature of certain truths, rather reveals the complex nature of the concrete knowing situation.

One might go on to other parts of logic and show that further reinterpretation is possible, but more than the bare hint which I now throw out is beyond the scope of the present paper. In this field, too, the significance of the hypothesis will be verified only if it makes good on some of the results which it promises. A complete survey of logical theory can be made in the light of the basic concepts which I have here

suggested. That such a survey would bring fruitful results is also to be regarded as a hypothesis still to be tested.

III

Finally, in the field of metaphysics some suggestions of far reaching import can be presented. In the light of my analysis I think it is not an overstatement to say that most systems of metaphysics are examples of 'objective dogmatism'; or, if not quite so bad, at least they are 'subjectively dogmatic'. My point is this. The authors of those systems work out a point of view which seems satisfactory to themselves, but do not pause to take account of the fact that others heartily disagree in the results, and no basis of general agreement is laid except the accident of common interest.

I take it that my analysis of interest shows that knowledge in its nature is selective. From it a world is constructed which, by virtue of its subjective importance, is taken to be the real world. Yet it is also obvious that for others this is not the real world. They, too, have their own real world which, indeed, to some extent, coincides with mine. The problem for metaphysics is: How pick between these different worlds? In the light of what interest is the world of metaphysics to be viewed?

The philosopher has sought to answer this problem by claiming a disinterestedness on which to base a supposedly impartial picture. This, however, is another type of objective dogmatism which fails completely to recognize the selective character of knowledge. The uncomfortable situation arises that groups, all of whom claim to be disinterested, get difficult pictures of the world.

The scientist has also patted himself on the back (and he has some reason for doing so, for has he not been successful in securing a larger measure of agreement than men in other fields?), because his categories gave a significant interpretation of the ultimate nature of the world. Yet the develop-

ment of scientific thought in the last twenty-five years has made him more humble with respect to the ultimate validity of conclusions; and he has tended to emphasize method rather than results, if, indeed, he has not turned philosopher. The claim to ultimate validity is greatly softened. Science becomes a method for securing control and agreement, rather than a discipline which gives a final snapshot of the world.

And so I might go on, but it will not be necessary. The problems for metaphysics may be briefly stated: (a) In view of the selective nature of knowledge revealed in this analysis of the role of interests, what meaning can be given to the term 'ultimate reality'? (b) If some meaning be given it, what interest is to be preferred? Further problems also suggest themselves. The old distinction between opinion and knowledge seems significant in the light of a term such as social objectivity, but the nature of the distinction is reversed. For Plato opinion was the possession of the many, knowledge that of the few. Social objectivity points with suspicion to the opinions of the few, and with more approval to those views which are widely accepted, provided they are based on right observation. The certainty of demonstration of concepts gives way to the less precise but more public method of securing objectivity through social agreement.

The attempt to establish, through social agreement, norms and standards as criteria for truth will also have significant bearings on the problems of ethics and aesthetics. The close interrelation of the value problems of these disciplines has been impressed upon me as I have given some consideration to the implications of the concepts of interest and social objectivity.

The final outcome of my attempted solution of the simple quest from which I started is to raise problems which reach to the foundations of all the branches of philosophy. And this, I take it, is itself a matter of merit rather than defect.

The paths suggested for further investigation in these different fields have played no small part in the fascination of the attempted solution. It is my pious hope that by following the implications of this analysis still further a method may be found for securing greater social agreement among philosophers. Certainly the methods of the past two thousand years have been defective in this respect. The piety and the hope are of course still subjective.

LIST OF WORKS REFERRED TO

- Alexander, Samuel, "Collective Willing and Truth", *Mind* Vol. XXII, 1913, New Series, 1920, *Space, Time, and Deity* Macmillan and Co., Limited, London.
- Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, Trans. by Agnes McCaskill, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1915.
- Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle*, Edited by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, *De Sensu*.
- Bailey, Cyril, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, Oxford, 1928.
- Barry, Frederick, *The Scientific Habit of Thought*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1928.
- Bentham, Jeremy, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, (Rand, Benjamin, *The Classical Moralists*, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1909)
- Blumberg, Albert E., and Feigl, Herbert, "Logical Positivism", *The Journal Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 11, May 21, 1931.
- Bradley, F. H., *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914.
—*The Principles of Logic*, Oxford, 1928.
- Brayshaw, Alfred Neave, *The Quakers, Their Story and Messages*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927.
- Brown, Harold Chapman, "Intelligence and Mathematics", *Creative Intelligence*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1927.
- Burns, Cecil Deslisle, *The Contact Between Minds*, The Macmillan Company, Limited, London, 1923.
- Burt, Edwin Arthur, *Principles and Problems of Right Thinking*, Revised Edition, Harper and Bros., New York, 1931.
- Butler, Joseph, *Sermons Upon Human Nature*, (Rand, Benjamin, *The Classical Moralists*, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1909)
- Campbell, Norman, *What Is Science?*, Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, 1921.
- Creighton, James Edwin, *Studies in Speculative Philosophy*, Edited with a Select Bibliography by Harold R. Smart, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925.
- Croce, Benedetto, *The Philosophy of the Practical*, Trans. Douglas Ainslie, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London, 1913.
- Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature*, Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1925.
- Ducassee C. J., "A Liberalistic Theory of Truth", *Philosophical Review*, Volume XXXIV, 1925.
- Eaton, Ralph Monroe, *Symbolism and Truth*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1925.
- Enriques, Federigo, *Problems of Science*, authorized translation by Katharine Royce, Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1914.
- Fite, Warner, *The Living Mind*, Lincoln MacVeagh (The Dial Press), New York, 1930.
- Follett, M. P., *Creative Experience*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1930.

- Fox, Charles, *Educational Psychology*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1927.
- Gide, Charles, *Political Economy*, D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, n.d.
- Goblot, Edmond, *Traité de Logique*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1925.
- Green, Thomas Hill, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Edited by A. C. Bradley, Oxford University Press, 1906.
- Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, reprint from edition of 1651, Oxford, 1929.
- Hobson, John Atkinson, *Economic and Ethics*, D. C. Heath and Co., Boston, 1929.
- Hodder, A., "Truth and the Tests of Truth", *Philosophical Review*, Volume V, 1896.
- Hoernlé, R. F. A., "Image, Idea, and Meaning", *Mind*. Volume XVI, New Series, 1907.
- Hollingworth, H. L., *Psychology*, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1928.
- Holt, Edwin Dissell, *The Concept of Consciousness*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1914.
- James, William, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1893.
- Jefferson, Thomas, *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Collected and Edited by Paul Leicester Ford, C. F. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1905.
- Johnson, Allen, *The Historian and Historical Evidence*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926.
- Kant, Immanuel, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, The Macmillan Company, Ltd., London, 1929.
—*Kant's Critique of Judgment*, MacMillan and Company, Limited London, 1914.
- Lewis, Clarence Irving, *Mind and the World Order*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1929.
- Loewenberg, J., "The Prepositional Nature of Truth", University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 11, *Studies in the Nature of Truth*, Berkeley, 1929.
- Lossky, N. O., *The Intuitive Basis of Truth*, Translated by Nathalie A. Duddington, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1919.
- Lovejoy, Arthur O., *The Revolt Against Dualism*, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1930.
- Mackay, D. S., "Esthetic and Experimental Truth", University of California Publications in Philosophy, *The Problem of Truth*, Volume 10, Berkeley, 1928.
- McDougall, William, *Outline of Psychology*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1923.
- McKeon, Richard, *Selections from Mediaeval Philosophers*, Edited and Translated with Introductory Notes by Richard McKeon, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1929, 1930, 2 vols.
- Mead, George H., "The Mechanism of Social Consciousness", *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method*, Vol. IX, 1912.
- Montague, Wm. Pepperell, *The Ways of Knowing*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925.
- Morris, Charles William, "The Prediction Theory of Truth", *The Monist*, Volume XXXVIII, 1928.

- Muirhead, John H., "The Problem of Truth and Some Principles in Aid of Its Solution", University of California Publications In Philosophy, *The Problem of Truth*, Volume 10, 1928.
- Perry, Ralph Barton, *General Theory of Value*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1926.
- Pillsbury, W. B., *Attention*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1908.
- Poincaré, H., *The Foundations of Science*, Translated by George Bruce Halsted, The Science Press, New York, 1921.
- Reid, Louis Arnaud, *Knowledge and Truth*, The Macmillan Co., Limited, London, 1923.
- Rogers, Arthur Kenyon, *What is Truth?*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1923.
- Royce, Josiah, "The Principles of Logic", *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Macmillan and Company, Ltd., London, 1913.
- Santayana, George, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1924.
- Schneider, Herbert Wallace, *The Puritan Mind*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1930.
- Sidgwick, Henry, *The Methods of Ethics*, Seventh Edition, Macmillan and Company, Limited, London, 1922.
- Sigwart, Dr. Christoph, *Logic*, Swan, Sonnenschein and Company, London, 1895.
- Smith, Norman Kemp, *Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Truth*, Macmillan and Company, Limited, London, 1924.
- Spinoza, Benedict, *Philosophical Writings*, Translated from the Latin with an introduction by R. H. M. Elwes, George Bell and Sons, London, 1884, 2 vols.
- Stout, C. F., *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, Macmillan and Company, Limited, London, 1930.
- Strong, C. A., *Essays in the Natural Origin of the Mind*, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1930.
- Trevelyn, George Macauley, *England in the Age of Wycliffe*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1904.
- Troland, Leonard T., *The Principles of Psychophysiology*, Vol. 1, *The Problems of Psychology and Perception*, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York, 1929.
- Urban, Wilbur Marshall, *The Intelligible World*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1929.
- Ward, James, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1906.
- Psychological Principles*, Cambridge University Press, 1920.
- Watson, John B., *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1924.
- Wheeler, "Attention and Association", *The Psychological Review*, Vol. XXXV, 1928.
- Whitehead, Alfred North, *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927.
- Woodworth, Robert S., *Psychology*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1927.

